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THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION:
POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
Ronald D. Rotunda*
I. INTRODUCfiON

While 160 nations have signed the Chemical Weapons Convention ("CWC"), only 75 countries have ratified it thus far. On
April 25, 1997, after years of political maneuvers, the U.S. Senate finally added the United States to the list, after a vote that
was considered too close to call until shortly before ratification. 1
Although the final Senate vote was a lop-sided 74 to 26, the period prior to ratification witnessed a great deal of jockeying, as
liberal supporters of the treaty criticized their conservative opponents.2 This liberal support was a little surprising because
there are important objections to the treaty based on the Fourth
Amendment, which liberals, in other contexts, have supported.
Obviously the goal of the CWC-removing the terror of
chemical weapons-is laudable, but its procedures raise important questions under the Bill of Rights, particularly under the
Fourth Amendment, regulating searches and seizures, and the
Fifth Amendment, guaranteeing no taking of property without
just compensation. Some proponents of the CWC have responded to the constitutional argument by attacking the motives
of those who raise these constitutional questions, accusing them
of really being "glued to a 'we're No.1' mentality." 3

• Albert E. Jenner, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Illinois, UrbanaChampaign. I thank Sandra Pulley, J.D., '99, the Stuart N. Greenberger Research Assistant of the University of Illinois.
I. What's News, Wall Street Journal AI (Apri125, 1997).
2. Thomas E. Ricks, Senate Approves Chemical-Arms Pact, Wall Street Journal
A2 (Apr. 25, 1997).
3. See, e.g., Mary McGrory, A Lott of Gas, Washington Post Cl (Dec. 22, 1996),
who repeats a refrain often found in the popular discussion of the CWC. She said:
"Opponents, meanwhile, are glued to a 'we're No. 1' mentality: We should not be subject to unannounced, foreign inspection." Id. C2 .
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Whatever one thinks of the bona fides of those who criticize
the ewe, it is noteworthy that supporters of the ewe have
urged Congress to enact legislation that would prohibit state and
federal courts from enjoining ewe inspections even when those
inspections and searches violate the Constitution. 4 Surely, it is
reasonable to be concerned about the constitutionality of the
searches authorized by the CWC, when its supporters concede
the constitutional problem and try to work around it, not by
amending the ewe, but by limiting the courts' jurisdiction to
enforce the Constitution.5
Before directly turning to the Constitutional questions, it is
important to put the issue in perspective. It was not necessary
for the United States to ratify the ewe in order to eliminate its
stockpile of chemical weapons. We can eliminate our own
stockpile unilaterally. (In fact, we already have decided to

4. E.g., Barry Kellman and Edward Tanzman, Implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention: Legal Issues (Lawyers Alliance for World Security, Committee for National Security, July, 1994) at 16:
"While judicial interference with the CWC is unlikely because of national security and foreign affairs implication, a legislative ban on injunctions against ewe
inspections would eliminate this risk entirely. Instead of seeking an injunction,
the subject of the inspection should be permitted to seek monetary damages as
compensation for any losses resulting from an unconstitutional search."
[emphasis added.]
Limiting the jurisdiction of federal courts so that they cannot enjoin violations of
the Fourth Amendment is unconstitutional. If a search is unconstitutional, Congress
cannot avoid that problem by limiting the courts' jurisdiction to rule on that claim. See
Ronald D. Rotunda, Congressional Power to Restrict the Jurisdiction of the Lower Federal Courts and the Problem of School Busing, 64 Georgetown L.J. 839 (1976). See also
1 Ronald D. Rotunda and John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance
and Procedure§§ 2.10, 2.11 (West Publishing, 2d ed. 1992).
The Clinton Administration has argued that it can bypass the warrant clause for national security purposes. SeeR. Jeffrey Smith, Administration Backing No-Warrant Spy
Searches, Washington Post A19 (July 15, 1994), quoting Deputy Attorney General Jamie S. Gorelick, who claimed that the President "has inherent authority to conduct warrantless searches for foreign intelligence purposes." ld. Of course, President Clinton is
not the only President to make such claims. President Nixon asserted similar powers.
Richard Gid Powers, Secrecy and Power 439-85 (Free Press, 1987).
5. Kellman and Tanzman, Implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention (cited
in note 4) argue that Congress should authorize a damage remedy; they argue that the
Government should specifically consent to suit under the Federal Torts Claims Act, 28
U.S.C.A. §§ 136(b), 2680, so that it is clear that "a victim of an unconstitutional search
can receive damages, during unconstitutional arms control verification activities .... "
Kellman and Tanzman, Implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention at 18 (cited in
note 4) (emphasis added).
However, violations of the Fourth Amendment, like violations of the First Amendment's free speech guarantee, cannot be "cured" by a damage remedy. If damages were
an effective remedy, there would be no need for an exclusionary rule. As discussed below, the Fifth Amendment clause prohibiting the taking of property "without just compensation" is the only clause where money damages provide a cure.
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eliminate our chemical arms by 2004, prior to the time we would
have to eliminate them under the treaty.)
Similarly, the ratification of the ewe does not prevent the
United States from renouncing the use of chemical weapons. In
the past, the United States has threatened to use chemical
weapons only in retaliation-if other countries used those
weapons first. We can, if we wish, unilaterally forgo any chemical retaliatory option. Again, the ewe has nothing to do with
that issue.
The dispute involving the ewe focuses, instead, on different questions. Is the manufacture and storage of chemical
weapons verifiable-particularly when the manufacturer is a
private person, and the storage facility is some terrorist's garage? Are the intrusive search mechanisms of this treaty constitutional? If this particular treaty, even with its intrusive
searches, still allows too many loopholes that impinge on verification, does that affect the analysis of the Fourth Amendment?
Is it proper for the United States to authorize inspectors (who
will be searching for evidence of a crime6) to engage in extensive
and highly intrusive searches without any requirement or procedure for the inspectors to seek a search warrant? Normally, we
expect criminal search warrants to describe with particularity
the places to be searched and the things to be seized. Moreover,
they may be issued only after a neutral judicial officer finds
probable cause. But the ewe and its implementing legislation
provide for none of that. 7 Under these circumstances, is this
treaty constitutional and will it work?
6. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, S. Treaty Doc.
No. 21, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), Art. VII, '1'1 1(a), (b), and (c), reprinted in 32
I.L.M. 800 (1993) ("CWC").
These provisions make clear that if the United States ratifies the CWC, it agrees to
"[p]rohibit natural and legal persons" within its jurisdiction from "undertaking any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention, including enacting penal legislation with respect to such activity." CWC, Art. VII, H(a) (emphasis added).
Further, the United States will obligate itself to "[e]xtend its penal legislation enacted under subparagraph (a) to any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken anywhere by natural persons, possessing its nationality, in conformity with international law." CWC, Art. VII, 'I 1(c) (emphasis added). Note that this
subparagraph requires that the penal legislation conform to international law. There is
no requirement that the legislation must conform to our Constitution. It is not a defense, under this subparagraph, that the United States refuses to enact penal legislation
on the grounds that it violates our Constitution.
7. Initially, the proposed Chemical Weapons Implementation Act-which will
ensure observance of the requirements of the CWC-provides for the use of search warrants, and for warrantless search warrants in exigent circumstances. See S. 495, 105th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1997), proposed Title I, §§ 229A(a)(1),(2), in 143 Cong. Rec. S2660
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II. LIMITATIONS OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS
CONVENTION
A. INTRODUcriON

Proponents of the ewe typically claim that American ratification is essential because it is our last great chance to outlaw
chemical warfare. For all its defects, supporters say that it is
better than nothing, and that its benefits justify limiting and narrowly applying the Fourth Amendment. 8 Opponents express
concern that the Chemical Weapons Convention-although it
authorizes very intrusive searches without warrants and without
probable cause-is like a generous legacy in a pauper's will,9
which promises much but delivers little, because of its significant
loopholes.
The question of whether the CWC accompanies intrusive
searches with significant loopholes has a Fourth Amendment
dimension, because, as discussed below, the Court is more likely
to invalidate a statutory10 system of searches that is not welldesigned and narrowly tailored to ferret out wrongdoing. 11 A
defective ewe that is not carefully drafted and promises more
than it can deliver is more likely to be invalid under the Fourth
Amendment. If the ewe has both intrusive searches and significant loopholes, then it is much worse than a generous legacy
in a pauper's will, for it intrudes on important constitutional
rights without fulfilling its promise of eliminating chemical warfare.
Let us now turn to some of the political issues that affect
the question whether the ewe is verifiable and consider if these

(daily ed., March 20, 1997). See generally 3 Ronald D. Rotunda and John E. Nowak,
Treatise on Constitutional Law§§ 18.30 (b) (cited in note 4) (discussing some emerging
issues involving the right to privacy).
8. See, e.g., Thomas A. Connolly, Does the Constitution Limit On-Site Inspection?, Arms Control Today 8 (July, 1988). See also Edward L. Rowny, Yes to the Chemical Weapons Accord, Washington Post A21 (April 23, 1997), supponing the CWC as
better than nothing and stating: "However, I must emphasize that we should not be
overly optimistic about the effectiveness of the CWC"; David Kay, et al., First the
Treaty, Then the Hard Work, Washington Post C7 (April 13, 1997), stating: "A perfect
solution? No. But clearly it is better than the available alternatives."
9. Cf. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 186 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring): "a
promise to the ear to be broken to the hope, a teasing illusion like a munificent bequest
in a pauper's will."
10. The CWC is not a self-executing treaty and Congress will have to enact a statutory scheme to implement it.
11. Chandler v. Miller, 117 S. Ct. 1295 (1997), discussed in Pan II.D. at 137-39.
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political issues may influence the resolution of the constitutional
questions.
B. NON-SIGNATORIES

One inherent limitation of the CWC is that outlaw countries can simply refuse to ratify it. The threat posed to the
United States by chemical weapons is less likely to come from
countries like Sweden, than from pariah states like Libya, Syria,
North Korea, and Iraq-none of which have ever signed the
treaty, let alone ratified it. Moreover, we should also expect
that some foreign countries that do sign the ewe will evade it
by movinfl their chemical weapons facilities to non-signatory
countries. For example, the Central Intelligence Agency has
acknowledged that: "Some other republics [of the former Soviet
Union] maintain that Russia still has chemical weapons materials in their territories." 13
C. THE CWC'S LIMITED BAN OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Countries that do ratify the CWC can also avoid violation
or detection by redirecting their chemical efforts. Given the nature of chemical weapons, many chemicals have multiple uses,
only one of which would be illegal under the treaty. There is no
way to avoid this problem because chemicals necessary to produce mustard gas are also needed to produce ink for pens. 14
Chlorine was used in World War I in chemical warfare, though
today we use it legally for laundry. 15 The Nazi gas chambers relied on legal rodenticides, and many legal dyes, drugs, additives,
and pesticides can become chemical weapons by minor changes
in their processing. 16 Ordinary chemicals can be put to extraordinary, and lethal, use.

12. E.g., Mark Yost, China's Deadly Trade in the Mideast, Wall Street Journal A18 (Dec. 4, 1996), reporting that U.S. intelligence sources, relying on documents seized
from Germans involved with illegal weapons sales, are concerned that China may be
involved in supplying equipment for an underground chemical weapons factory in Syria.
China has also been a supplier to Mideast countries such as Iran and Iraq.
13. See Letter of August 27, 1993, from Admiral William 0. Studeman (then Acting Director of the CIA) to Senator John Glenn (on file with the author).
14. Even supporters of the CWC concede this point. E.g., Mary McGrory, A Lott
of Gas C2 (cited in note 3).
15. Ian V. Hogg, Gas 24 (Ballantine Books, 1975).
16. E.g., John Adams, The Chemical Weapons Convention: Legal and Juridical Observations, 1 International and Security Law News 3 (Fall, 1996) <http://www.homesites.
com/fed-sodin010104.htm>.
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We should also expect that other countries will develop
more advanced chemical weapons that work around the restrictions of the ewe and exploit its limitations. The intelligence
community recently reported that Russia is developing and producing a new generation of chemical weapons that are not covered by the eWC's Schedule of ehemicals. 17 Just as restrictive
tax laws spawn more creative tax shelters, the ewe should be
expected to beget different types of chemical weapons. The
ewe will likely channel (rather than ban) chemical weapons
development into types that may be more insidious, more dangerous, and less detectable.
These new Russian nerve gases, such as A-232, are made
from common industrial and agricultural chemicals. Two relatively harmless compounds are stored in separate containers.
Because they are not lethal until mixed, they are easier to manufacture than conventional nerve gas, more difficult to detect,
and safer to transport and stockpile, until they are mixed together, when they then become deadly. Even microscopic
amounts of A-232 can kill. This type of chemical weapon was
expressly designed to be outside of the ewe ban. If Russia
were to ratify the ewe, production of these types of chemical
18
weapons (called Novichok "binary" weapons) could continue.
The ewe does not affect weapons designed to circumvent its
verification regime.
A veteran Soviet chemical weapons specialist, who confirmed the development of these binary weapons (and was jailed
for his whistle-blowing), has reported:
Our generals see the implementation of the [CWC] treaty
with its loopholes as a way to dispose of their obsolete and
hazardous stockpiles with American taxpayer's help, while
preserving their new classes of toxins and, even worse, permit19
ting their sale abroad for hard currency.

D. OTHER LOOPHOLES
The ewe claims that it will eliminate all chemical weapons
and will effectively ban their use, development, production, de17. Bill Gertz, Russia Dodges Chemical Arms Ban: New Nerve Agent Hard to Un·
cover, Washington Times A1 (Feb. 4, 1997), available at 1997 WL 3662854.
18. J. Michael Waller, The Chemical Weapons Coverup, Wall Street Journal A18
(Feb. 13, 1997).
19. Vii Mirzayanov, Free to Develop Chemical Weapons, Wall Street Journal A16
(May 25, 1994), available at 1994 WL 333375. Mr. Mirzayanov was jailed in 1992 and in
1994 for revealing Moscow's continuation of covert chemical weapons production.
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ployment, and stockpiling. 20 When something sounds too good
to be true, it usually is. Consider an unremarkable chemical implement of war' riot control chemicals, and what the ewe says
about them. The CWC signatories solemnly agree that Each State Party undertakes not to use riot control agents as a
21
method of warfare.

"Chemical Weapons" are defined as including-"Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purposes
not prohibited under this Convention .... "22
This definition does not seem noteworthy, until one moves
to another section of the ewe, where we learn that what the
right hand giveth, the left hand taketh away, for the ewe tells
us that the phrase, "Purposes Not Prohibited Under this Convention," means, among other things: "Law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes. "23
In short, countries may develop, test, stockpile, and use riot
control chemicals, as long as they purport to use them domestically. The CWC does not ban riot control chemicals; instead, it
appears to authorize countries to use against their own civilians
what they may not use against enemy troops in time of war. 24
Moreover, if these riot control weapons are used against enemy
troops, we may never know for sure. Even today, not all
authorities agree on the extent to which there was the use of
chemical weapons by the North Vietnamese during the Vietnam
War, and by the Iraqis during the Gulf War. 25
20. ewe, Preamble, 6th 'I (unnumbered] (cited in note 6), states that its goal is:
"to exclude completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons." A related (and
somewhat inconsistent) goal is: "to promote free trade in chemicals ... " Id. at 9th 'I
[unnumbered].
21. CWC, An. I, 'I 5 (cited in note 6).
22. CWC, An. II, 'l1(a) (cited in note 6).
23. CWC, An. II, 'I 9(d) (cited in note 6) (emphasis added).
24. President Clinton has announced that he interprets the ewe to forbid the
United States from using riot control agents "even for humanitarian purposes in situations where combatants and noncombatants are intermingled, such as the rescue of
downed air crews, passengers and escaping prisoners and situations where civilians are
being used to mask or screen attacks." Statement of June 23, 1994, quoted in Letter of
Senator Jesse Helms to National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, Feb. 13, 1997 at 6 (on
file with author). So foreign countries can continue to manufacture and store riot control agents, while the United States will be forbidden to use these agents when they are
the most humane way of rescuing downed air crews. He is interpreting the ewe more
strictly than the military has been interpreting it, and more strictly than the drafters interpreted it. ld.
25. See, e.g., Dana Priest, CIA Analysts of Iraqi Chemical Weapons in Gulf Interviewed Only Last Month, Washington Post A18 (April16, 1997).
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Another particularly significant loophole is found in a portion of the ewe that authorizes the inspection team to examine
vehicular traffic exiting the inspection site,26 but excludes from
this inspection all "personal passenger vehicles exiting the
site .... " 21 Chemical weapons are not like armored tanks.
Chemical weapons can be easily hidden in the trunk of any passenger car. Sometimes only drops of a chemical are needed to
cause many deaths. The ewe provision exempting passenger
trunks only guarantees that those who wish to transport chemical weapons right under the noses of the CWC inspectors will
use the trunks of their passenger cars rather than pickup trucks.
Of course, the fact that the ewe will not be entirely effective is not, by itself, an argument against it. The best should not
be an enemy of the good. However, ratification of the CWC
may lull our vigilance and undercut future efforts to develop a
Convention that works. The ewe, in that case, would undercut
rather that promote the reduction of chemical weapons.
More importantly, loopholes like these in the CWC affect
the analysis of the Fourth Amendment. Consider Chandler v.
28
Miller, where the Court invalidated a Georgia law that required candidates for certain state offices to certify that they had
tested negative for illegal drug use within 30 days prior to qualifying for nomination. The Court (8 to 1) found that the statute
was unconstitutional because it was an unreasonable
"suspicionless" search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. In
the course of its analysis of the problem, the Court found that an
important reason the Georgia law was invalid under the Fourth
Amendment is thatGeorgia's certification requirement is not well designed to
identify candidates who violate antidrug laws. Nor is the
scheme a credible means to deter illicit drug users from seeking
election to state office. The test date-to be scheduled by the
candidate anytime within 30 days prior to qualifying for a
place on the ballot-is no secret.... [U]sers of illegal drugs,
save for those prohibitively addicted, could abstain for a pre29
test period sufficient to avoid detection.

26. ewe, Verification Annex, Part X (Challenge Inspections), n 29, 30 (cited in
note 6).
27. ewe, Verification Annex, Part X (Challenge Inspections), 'I 30 (cited in note
6).
28. 117 S. Ct. 1295 (1997).
29. 117 S. Ct. at 1303-04 (emphasis added).
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A similar analysis applies to the CWC. A treaty that provides for suspiciousless searches of factories and trucks leaving
the factory but not the trunks of cars leaving these factories is,
like the law invalidated in Chandler, a treaty that "is not well
designed to identify [people] who violate [chemical weapons]
laws." Nor does the CWC offer "a credible means to deter illicit" production and storage of chemical weapons.
E. FAILURE OF WILL
In order for the CWC to work, it must be enforced. We
would expect that the United States will be willing to enforce
the treaty within our own borders. If we find a terrorist group
clandestinely storing chemical weapons, we would take action.
But will the United States or other nations be willing to take action against a state that is found to have violated the treaty?
There have been disquieting reports that the international
community, including the United States, is not enforcing the
blockade against Iraq. 30 If nations, including the United States,
will not vigorously enforce sanctions against Iraq, imposed after
it was defeated in a war, will they enforce the CWC? This failure of will, while troubling, is more of a political than a constitutional issue and probably does not affect the Fourth Amendment analysis under cases like Chandler.
F. INABILITY TO VERIFY

Perhaps no Convention, no matter how intrusive its search
mechanisms, can stop a small number of individuals from creating or storing chemical weapons. U.S. military experts have testified that it is a fruitless exercise to stamp out these easily concealable weapons. As CIA Director R. James Woolsey said in
1994: "The chemical-weapons problem is so difficult from an intelligence perspective that I cannot state that we have high confidence in our ability to detect noncompliance, especially on a
small scale." 31 Others have echoed this view. 32 Neophytes
should not jump in where experts fear to tread.
30. Mark Yost, Iran Helps Iraq Beat Oil Embargo; Will U.S. Respond?, Wall Street
Journal A18 (Feb. 13, 1997). Vice Admiral Thomas B. Fargo announced that there is
solid evidence that Iran is helping Iraq smuggle oil, but "[s]everal Navy officers said that
they had been told not to scrutinize Iranian-flagged vessels closely, even in international
waters." Id.
31. J. Michael Waller, The Chemical Weapons Coverup, A18 (cited in note 18).
Similarly, a National Intelligence Estimate, in May of 1995, concluded that production
of new chemical weapons "would be difficult to detect and confirm as a CWC-sponsored
activity." Id.
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Our experience thus far should cause us to be modest in estimating our ability to ferret out chemical weapons production
and storage. Consider the U.N. experience with Iraq. The current inspection of Iraq (defeated in the Persian Gulf War) by
the United Nations Special Commission ("UNSCOM") is the
most intrusive, systematic, and rigorous inspection in modem
times. UNSCOM has had unprecedented access to Iraq for
years. Yet the United Nations did not uncover significant information about Iraq's chemical weapons capability from its onsite inspectors. Rather, it uncovered this information because of
a defector. 33 Intrusive as the CWC is, it will not be as intrusive
as the inspection of a defeated nation by the victors in war. Yet,
Iraq was able to conceal this significant information from U.N.
inspectors, until the defection of a key soldier.
The inability to verify, like the treaty loopholes, is not just a
political issue but a constitutional one under cases like Chandler.
Recall that the Court there said that one reason the Georgia law
must be invalidated is that the Georgia scheme is not "a credible
means to deter illicit drug users from seeking election to state
office," because it was easily evaded. 34
If the problem with the ewe were merely its inability to
verify violations, it would merely be useless, like a magnificent
legacy in a pauper's will. But the CWC is much worse if it also
compromises our constitutional guarantees. Then, unlike an
empty legacy, it will cause actual harm. The average American
business or a typical individual-neither of whom are in the
business of manufacturing poison gas-will be subject to extensive and intrusive inspections, that may violate the Fourth
Amendment and the Fifth Amendment. To those issues we now
tum.
32. For example, then Vice President Bush said that "plants for producing chemical weapons are difficult to distinguish from plants producing chemicals for industry and,
in fact, some chemicals with peaceful utility are structurally similar to some chemicals
that are used in warfare. So verification is particularly difficult with chemical weapons."
Speech by Vice President George Bush, Conference on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons Convention, April 18, 1984, reprinted in U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, Documents on Disarmament 299,300 (1984).
33. Hussein Kamel's defection prompted Baghdad to tum over 100 boxes of information about its chemical and biological weapons' program. The U.N. did not know
about this information, and it never would have come to light had there been no defection. See Daniel Williams, Iraqi Defectors Killed On Return to Baghdad; Relatives Reportedly Shot Brothers, Washington Post A1, A18 (Feb. 24, 1996); Greg Myre, After 5
Years in Iraq, Work Is Still Turbulent for U.N. Arms Inspectors, Washington Post A16
(April 9, 1996).
34. 117 S. Ct. at 1304.
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Ill. CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
A. INTRODUCTION

Does the proposed Convention violate constitutional guarantees? In particular, let us focus on two constitutional issuesthe Search and Seizure Clause of the Fourth Amendment and
the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
First, if the intrusive searches result in loss of intellectual
property, will just compensation be provided? Even supporters
of the ewe acknowledge that it may facilitate or enable foreign
governments or inspectors from those governments to engage in
industrial espionage, the theft of trade secrets, and the taking of
other types of intellectual property. 35 The ewe itself offers no
just com:fensation for those whose property has been literally
"taken."
Second, do the inspection mechanisms that the Convention
envisions violate the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures?· The ewe contemplates extremely intrusive searches of private property. The ewe search
of private property must be unusually thorough to have any
chance of working effectively, but such invasive searches create
a greater risk of a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Numerous businesses or persons will be subject to these searches. Because of the multiple uses of chemicals and the ease with which
many chemical weapons can be created or stored, we may expect searches of over ten thousand U.S. businesses (perhaps
50,000 industrial facilities or more), that might use, produce, or
35. E.g., Barry Kellman, et al., Disarmament and Disclosure: How Arms Control
Verification Can Proceed Without Threatening Confidential Business Information, 36
Harv. Inti. L.J. 71, 101 (1995).
36. The Chemical Manufacturers Association has supported a global ban on the
manufacture and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Yet it has also expressed concern for
the "loss of proprietary information," because of the work of the international agency
that the ewe creates. The loss of trade secrets can amount to a "multimillion dollar
price tag." It "can cripple even a giant company and can be fatal to a smaller enterprise." The U.S. Chemica/Industry Can Live With a Chemical Weapons Convention,
Arms Control Today 21 (Nov., 1989). See also Burrus M. Carnahan, Chemical Arms
Control, Trade Secrets, and the Constitution: Facing the Unresolved Issues, 25 Inti Lawyer 167, 170-71 (1991).
This last point ("fatal to a smaller enterprise") is quite significant. The burdens of
the ewe fall disproportionately on smaller companies. Companies will also have costs
associated with inspections. Larger businesses, those who typically have various government contracts, will pass along the expenses to the U.S. Government. Also, for large
busi~esses, the extra costs are marginal. For smaller businesses, the costs may be proportiOnally greater, and they are less likely to have the luxury of passing on the costs to
the Government.
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store chemicals. 37 Any soap factory or ink pen factory can produce or store chemical weapons.
However, CWC searches are not limited to places of business. Private homes are also subject to CWC inspections. 38
One's garage or bedroom can be the storage place for chemical
weapons, or the place of their manufacture. Japan (which is not
limited by our Fourth Amendment) was unable to prevent areligious cult from producing and using sarin in its poison gas attack in the Tokyo subways. The cult made these chemical
weapons in a small, undistinguished room-not a high-tech lab.
As General William Burns (then head of the U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency) has said, "chemical weapons
can be manufactured in almost anyone's garage, as long as you
have a little high school chemistry behind you. " 39 If even extremely intrusive mechanisms will not be truly effective (and the
evidence suggests that they will not), then one wonders if all of
this is worth the candle.
B. APPLICABILITY OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
It should cause no shock that the U.S. Constitution applies
in foreign affairs, and that a treaty or executive agreement that
conflicts with the Constitution is unconstitutional. Surprisingly,
however, some commentators have occasionally argued, even in
recent times, that the foreign affairs power or so-called national
security powers limit the application of the Constitution. For
example, during the oral argument in Dames & Moore v.
Regan,«) which upheld the Iranian Hostage Executive Agreement, a lawyer supporting the Agreement argued that the
United States must release Iranian assets simply because the
Executive Agreement said so. Justice Rehnquist asked: "What
if the agreement had said no one in the U.S. should criticize the

37. E.g., Adams, The Chemical Weapons Convention: Legal and Juridical Observations at 10 (cited in note 16) (over 10,000 sites); Carnahan, 25 Inti. Law at 180 (cited in
note 36) (50,000 sites "might reasonably be subject to challenge inspection.") (footnote
omitted).
38. CWC, Art. IX, 'I (cited in note 6). See also, Kellman, et al., 36 Harv. Inti. L.J.
at 92 (cited in note 35).
39. Eric Hamburg, Constitution vs. Arms Control, New York Times A19 (Dec. 18,
1989).
40. 453 u.s. 654 (1981).
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Ayatollah? Would the U.S. be liable?" The lawyer said yes!
42
The Court, fortunately, rejected that argument.
43
Justice Black, in Reid v. eovert, articulated what is the
generally accepted view today among commentators and courts:
The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution.
Its power and authority have no other source. It can only act
in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution .... The concept that the Bill of Rights and other constitutional protections against arbitrary government are inoperative when they become inconvenient or when expediency
dictates otherwise is a very dangerous doctrine and if allowed
to flourish would destroy the benefit of a written Constitution
and undermine the basis of our government. ... [N]o agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress,
or on any other branch of Government, which is free from the
restraints of the Constitution.44

In short, if the United States could not constitutionally search a
factory, or a storage area, or a garage without a search warrant
or probable cause, then it cannot constitutionally authorize foreign inspectors to engage in such searches. The United States
cannot delegate to foreign officials a power that it does not possess. Searches that violate the Fourth Amendment are not
cured of the violation by the simple expediency of a treaty ratifi•
•
45
catiOn or an executive agreement.
Sometimes people argue that Congress should leave to the
courts the responsibility of sorting out these constitutional arguments.46 It is certainly true that the courts are the ultimate
safeguard of our liberty, but that ultimate safeguard should not
be used as an excuse for an earlier violation. The courts, when
reviewing the constitutionality of legislation, typically presume
41. See Ronald D. Rotunda, Modern Constitutional Law: Cases and Notes 256
(West Publishing, 5th ed. 1997).
42. See John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotunda, A Comment on the Creation and
Resolution of a "Nonproblem": Dames & Moore v. Regan, the Foreign Affairs Power,
and the Role of the Court, 29 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1129 (1982).
43. 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (plurality opinion). No other Justice disagreed with Justice
Black's statement. The contrary view derives from some dictum, taken out of context,
by Justice Holmes in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
44. 354 U.S. at 5-6, 14, 16 (Black, J., joined by Warren, C.J., Douglas, J., and
Brennan, J.) (plurality opinion) (footnotes omitted; emphasis added).
45. This issue is discussed in detail in 1 Rotunda and Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure § 6.5 (cited in note 4 ).
46. For example, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, in urging a Congressman to
support a bill in 1935, said: "I hope your committee will not permit doubts as to constitutionality, however reasonable, to block the suggested legislation." Quoted in Rotunda,
Modern Constitutional Law: Cases and Notes at 11 (cited in note 41).
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that it is constitutional. That presumption assumes that Congress has exercised its independent judgment. Congress should
not abdicate its constitutional duty when enacting legislation
that implements the CWC.47
C. APPLICATION OF CWCTO PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS
In evaluating the constitutional arguments, it is important
to realize that the ewe is unlike many treaties, which usually
apply only to governments. The CWC not only bans foreign
countries from manufacturing, developing, and storing certain
chemical weapons, 48 it also directly apglies the same restrictions
to private individuals and companies. 9 The countries ratifying
the ewe must allow international inspectors to engage in
"systematic verification through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments" of publicly or privately owned
places where targeted chemical weapons might be produced,
stored, etc. 50
D. JUST COMPENSATION
The Constitution provides that no private proEerty shall
"be taken for public use, without just compensation." 1 Intellectual property is a form of property. 52 If the federal government
simply takes this property, the Constitution requires that it pay
just compensation. If the federal government instead sets up a
legal structure that authorizes international inspectors to engage
in intrusive inspections that allow them to make off with intellectual property, there is also a "taking" for purposes of the just
compensation clause. 53 Even CWC supporters have conceded
that the "procedures likely to be applied to verify arms control
47. When a House Member argued that it would be "officious" to debate the con·
stitutionality, Madison responded that "it is incontrovertibly of as much importance of
this branch of Government as to any other, that the constitution be preserved entire. It
is our duty." 1 Annals of Congress 500 (1789) (emphasis added). That is why the Court
gives Congress "the presumption of validity its enactments now enjoy." City of Boerne
11. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157,2172 (1997).
48. Subject to its various exceptions, definitions, etc.
49. The ewe makes clear that "the detailed procedures for its implementation
shall apply to all chemical weapons owned or possessed by a State Party, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control ...." CWC, Art. IV, '11 (cited in note
6) (emphasis added).
50. CWC, Art. IV, 'I 3 (cited in note 6).
51. U.S. Const., Amend. 5.
52. E.g., 2 Rotunda and Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance and
Procedure§ 17.5 (cited in note 4) (di5cussing various types of property).
53. "Whenever property is taken from someone with the assistance of government
officers, there is a deprivation of property." Id. at § 17.5(b) (citing cases).

1998]

ewe AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS

145

treaties are sufficiently intrusive to pose a legitimate threat to"
confidential business information.54
Now that the ewe is ratified, the United States must enact
laws that will implement the ewes extensive inspection requirements backed by penal legislation that would apply to all
natural or legal persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States and all U.S. citizens abroad. 55 The intrusive inspections
create a serious risk of industrial espionage by foreign inspectors, many of whom come from cultures that do not respect intellectual property rights. 56 If, in the course of ewe inspections,
trade secrets or other forms of intellectual property are stolen
because of the eWC's intrusive searches, there will be a taking
of property, for which the Fifth Amendment guarantees just
•
51
compensation.
The ewe candidly acknowledges and concedes that there
is a risk of loss of trade secrets and other forms of intellectual
property. The organization that the ewe creates is supposed to
take "every precaution" to grotect the civil and military secrets
of which it becomes aware. This promise however, is vaguely
worded, does not explain exactly what will be done, and provides no mechanism for just compensation if intellectual property is stolen. If foreign inspectors abuse their position and steal
intellectual property, then the only realistic remedy is for the
United States to pay just compensation to those people who
have suffered damages.
The ewe allows each ratifying state to request an on-site
inspection "of any facility or location in the territory or in any
other place under the jurisdiction or control of any other State
Party" in order to resolve any questions regarding noncompliance.59 The inspected State Party has the "obligation to provide
54. Kellman, et at., 36 Harv. Inti. L.J. at 125 (cited in note 35) (the authors note
that, even with careful preventive measures, there will be loss of this information so that
the government should explore various means of providing just compensation).
55. CWC, Art. VII, 'I 1(c) (cited in note 6). The countries ratifying the CWC are
also obligated to enact legislation criminalizing an individual's production of targeted
chemicals.
56. These intrusive searches of private property, conducted without a warrant, also
raise problems under the Fourth Amendment, which will be discussed later.
57. See Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227,232 (1986) (Dow Chemical could raise Fifth Amendment "taking" claim if one who searches would use the confidential information obtained to compete with Dow); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467
U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984) (trade secrets are property protected by the just compensation
clause).
58. CWC, Art. VIII, 'I 5 (cited in note 6).
59. CWC, Art. IX, 'I 8 (cited in note 6).
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access," 60 and the right to "prevent disclosure of confidential information and data, not related to this Convention. " 61 This section acknowledges that intellectual property may be compromised, but limits the right to protect intellectual property to
information "not related to this Convention."
Given the nature of chemicals that can be used for dual
purposes (one legal, one illegal), virtually all relevant intellectual property will be "related to this Convention." Rather than
protecting intellectual property, the ewe recognizes that intellectual property can be compromised, but then limits the right of
the United States to protect the theft of the intellectual property
of its citizens. This provision appears to give U.S. citizens a
mere right to argue that the information is not related to the
Convention. Rather than protecting property, the CWC may
only give victims an opportunity to complain.
If the United States subsequently suspects that a particular
foreign inspector is likely to steal trade secrets or to compromise
any intellectual property during a certain inspection, the ewe
sets up a rather complex procedure to follow. When the initial
list of inspectors is presented, a country can declare which inspectors it does not accept.62 But once a State Party has been
notified of an inspection it "shall not seek to have removed from
the inspection team for that inspection any of the designated inspectors or inspection assistants named in the inspection team
list."63 In addition, if the Director-General of the CWC believes
that a country's non-acceptance "impedes the designation of a
sufficient number of inspectors or inspection assistants or otherwise hampers the effective fulfilment of the tasks of the Technical Secretariat," then the Director-General must refer the issue
to the Executive Council. 64
In short, the United States will have the ability to make initial objections, but these can be overruled by the Executive
Council. If the United States makes objections, some other
countries will make counter objections, in a tit-for-tat response,
just as some countries expel one of our diplomats in reaction to
our expelling one of theirs. The right to make objections (which
can be overruled and met with similar objections by other coun60. ewe, Art. IX, 'lll(b) (cited in note 6).
61. ewe, Art. IX, 'Ill( c) (cited in note 6) (emphasis added).
62. ewe, Verification Annex, Part II, 'I 2 (cited in note 6).
63. ewe, Verification Annex, Part II, 'I 5 (cited in note 6).
64. ewe, Verification Annex, Part II, 'I 7 (cited in note 6) (emphasis added).
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tries) may only provide a thin veneer of protection of American
interests.
While the ewe does not set up a just compensation
scheme, it does recognize that property, including intellectual
property, may be improperly taken. The Fifth Amendment's just
compensation clause does not forbid the taking of property.
The government can take property, if it pays just compensation.
In that sense, the just compensation clause is different from
other rights protected by the Bill of Rights, violations of which
cannot be cured simply by paying compensation. For example,
if the government prevents a citizen from exercising free speech,
the government has violated the First Amendment. The affected citizen may always sue the government for damages, but
payment of the damages does not "cure" the original violation.
If there is a theft of intellectual property because of the
ewe searches, the U.S. Government can "cure" this taking of
property by providing for just compensation. But first it must
establish a procedure to provide just compensation. The Government has not yet done so, and theories of compensation under present law are unclear at best. 65 Now that the United States
has ratified the ewe, it should tum its attention to creating a
fair, prompt, and reasonable procedure for just compensation.
This new just compensation law will have to deal with some
difficult procedural issues. For example, if an American claims
that an inspector stole his or her trade secrets, will the American
be able to subpoena the foreign inspector? If the foreign inspector refuses to submit to a deposition and discovery of relevant
materials, who will bear the cost of that refusal? Will the burden of proof shift if the foreign inspector ignores an American
subpoena? Implementing legislation should provide that the
United States Government would bear the cost, because it is the
United States Government that has authorized the inspector to
enter the country, to inspect the premises, and then to leave the
jurisdiction of the United States and its courts.
This new law will also have to determine how to measure
the value of the property that has been taken. The typical rule,
as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes announced, is that amount

65. See Carnahan, 25 Inti. Law at 173-77 (cited in note 36).
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due is measured by "What has the owner lost? not, What has the
taker gained. "66
There is an additional issue regarding just compensation.
As discussed in the next section, Fourth Amendment violations
cannot be "cured" merely by the payment of compensation. If
an action violates both the Fourth and the Fifth Amendment,
the remedies for the two violations are independent. The person whose Fourth Amendment rights are violated will also have
a Fifth Amendment right to compensation if there has been an
unlawful physical intrusion of his premises. 67
If the law limits the right of the owner of property to exclude others from areas that the property owner did not open to
the general public (which is exactly what the ewe does, by
granting a right of entrance to the inspectors, a right that is permanent as long as the ewe is in force), there is a taking for
which compensation is due. 68 As Justice Thurgood Marshall has
noted: "The power to exclude has traditionally been considered
one of the most treasured strands in an owner's bundle of property rights. " 69
Even if the degree of intrusion is quite minor, compensation is still due. Consider, for example, Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp. 70 A city ordinance required an owner
of a rental building to allow installation of a cable television receiver on the outside of the landlord's apartment building
(portions of her roof and the side of her building). The ordinance tried to avoid the takings issue by paying a one-time $1
fee. Justice Marshall, for the majority, rejected the city's argument and held that there was a taking, for which just compensation was due, even if the amount of the physical intrusion is no
"bigger than a breadbox."71

66. Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910). See also 2
Rotunda and Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure § 15.14
(cited in note 4).
67. Physical occupations are per se takings, for which just compensation is due.
See, e.g., id. at§ 15.12 and cases discussed therein.
68. E.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
69. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982)
(footnote omitted).
70. 458 u.s. 419 (1982).
71. ld. at 438 n.16.
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FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCH AND SEIZURE

1. Extensive, Thorough, Intrusive Inspections

The ewe makes clear that the inspectors, during the "nonchallenge inspections," have the right of "unimpeded access to
the inspection site." These "non-challenge inspections" involve
sites in the chemical industry that are subject to on-site inspections on a regular basis. There is no need for a nation to issue a
"challenge inspection"- based on a suspicion that the building
may harbor chemical weaponsn-in order for these facilities to
be subjected to an inspection. The inspectors in these situation
also have carte blanche in deciding which items can be inspected.73 The inspectors can interview personnel at the sites,
inspect all documents, take photographs, carry away samples,
analyze the samples, and keep portions of all samples. 74 There
may be continuous monitoring. 7
When it comes to "challenge inspections," the ewe has
similar carte blanche power in choosing the places for inspection.
The inspection team must have "unimpeded access to the inspection site. The items to be inspected will be chosen by the
inspectors." 76 The inspectors "shall have the right to inspect
documentation and records they deem relevant to the conduct
of their mission."n They have the right to have samples taken. 78
There is no evidentiary standard. There is no neutral magistrate. Indeed, the ewe authorizes the inspection team to use
"more intrusive procedures only as it deems necessary."79 The
inspection team polices itself. There is no probable cause; there
is no oath; there is no search warrant describing with particularity the places to be searched or the things to be seized. The
ewe inspection compares to the general, thorough, house-tohouse search that one might expect in wartime, in the midst of
the theater of war, while looking for a spy.
72.

ewe, Verification Annex, Part X, Challenge Inspections Pursuant to Art. IX,

'I 41 (cited in note 6).

73. CWC, Art. VI; CWC, Verification Annex, Part II, General Rules of Verification, '145 (cited in note 6).
74. ewe, Verification Annex, Part II, General Rules of Verification, H 46-58
(cited in note 6). The inspection team need only supply a warning of 24 hours before
showing up at the point of entry. For the initial inspection, the warning is 72 hours.
75. CWC, Verification Annex, Part III, 11 10, 17, 18 (cited in note 6).
76. CWC, Verification Annex, Part II, 'I 45 (cited in note 6).
77. CWC, Verification Annex, Part II, 'I 47 (cited in note 6).
78. CWC, Verification Annex, Part II, 'I 52 (cited in note 6).
79. CWC, Verification Annex, Part X, 'I 45 (cited in note 6) (emphasis added).
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Compare the general search envisioned by the CWC with
the Supreme Court's description of the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment:
The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the
things to be seized makes general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant
describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left
to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant. 80

A major purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to prevent exactly that which the ewe authorizes: "general warrants," which
grant government officials "sweeping power" to invade the
premises of "merchants and businessmen" in order to "search at
large for smuggled goods. "81
2. The Three Main Arguments that May Justify Limiting the
Application of the Fourth Amendment
There are three main arguments that proponents of the
CWC embrace in an effort to avoid the constitutional problems
arising from the CWC's authorization of extensive and intrusive
searches, without criminal search warrants, the decision of a
neutral magistrate, or probable cause.
a. Foreign Affairs or National Security Power
First, commentators have argued that the President's
"national security powers" justify inroads on the Fourth
Amendment. 82 One treaty supporter actually states:
[P]residential national security powers might permit U.S. consent to highly innovative and informative OSI [i.e. On-Site In80. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927). Marron is a half century old,
but since 1927 the Supreme Court has extended the application of the Fourth Amendment, not contracted it.
81. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311 (1978) (footnotes and citations
omitted). The Court also noted: "The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment protects commercial buildings as well as private homes." Id. at 311. Warrantless searches
are "generally unreasonable," and "this rule applies to commercial premises as well as
homes." Id. at 312.
[T]he Fourth Amendment's commands grew in large measure out of the colonists' experience with writs of assistance [which] granted sweeping power to
customs officials and other agents of the King to search at large for smuggled
goods.
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1977).
82. E.g., Connolly, Arms Control Today at 8, 9 (cited in note 8). See also Benjamin Wittes, Aldrich Ames' Legal Legacy: Surveillance Court Gets New Powers, Legal
Times 1, 22 (Nov. 7, 1994) (referring to Attorney General Reno's "inherent authority"
justification of warrantless searches).
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spection], particularly of commercial facilities with lesser constitutional protection.... Innovative, intrusive OSI of manufacturing, transportation, storage and R&D facilities could be
invaluable tools for arms control. The Constitution is favora83
bly disposed.

This national security argument, frankly, is surprising. The
people who are subject to the searches are neither foreign nationals nor agents of a foreign government; they are U.S. citizens living in the United States, not in the theater of war. Remember, when Attorney General John Mitchell tried to use
national security to undercut the application of the Fourth
Amendment, the Supreme Court was unpersuaded. 84 It has
never invoked the political question doctrine to avoid or to dismiss an individual's claim that the foreign affairs power violated
a constitutional right. 85
b. Spending Power

CWC supporters have also sought to rely on the Government's spending power. Basically, the line of reasoning is that
companies who contract with the Government will "waive" their
Fourth Amendment rights as a condition of doing business with
the Government. 86
If this argument is valid, one wonders the extent of its logic.
Could tenants in a Government housing project be forced to
"waive" their rights under the Fourth Amendment as a condition of receiving housing? 87 Why stop with the Fourth Amendment? Could the Government require housing tenants to waive
their rights against self incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, or their right to a jury trial in a criminal case? Could the
83. Connolly, Arms Control Today at 12 (cited in note 8) (emphasis added).
84. E.g., United States v. United States District Coun, 407 U.S. 297 (1972); Zweibon
v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976). See also
Powers, Secrecy and Power at 439-85 (cited in note 4).
85. Lewis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 486 n.6 (Foundation Press,
1972). See also David A. Koplow, Arms Control Inspection: Constitutional Restrictions
on Treaty Verification in the United States, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 229,325-30 (1988).
86. E.g., Connolly, Arms Control Today at 8, 9 (cited in note 8).
87. The Clinton Administration, in fact, has argued that public housing tenants
should be required to sign leases that would waive their Fourth Amendment rights and
allow the police to search their apartments without warrants. Guy Gugliotta, Clinton
Lets Police Raid Projects, Washington Post A1 (April 17, 1994). See also Oarence
Page, For CHA Residents, a Fight to Keep Their Constitutional Rights, Chicago Tribune
§1, 21 (April 13, 1994) (opposing Clinton plan); Editorial, Gun Sweeps: No Model for
Cities, New York Times A18 (April 20, 1994) (opposing Clinton policy); Charles
Ogletree and Abbe Smith, Clinton's Plan is Misguided, New York Times 23 (May 7,
1994) (opposing Qinton plan).
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Government force its contracting parties to waive their rights of
free speech? The right against cruel and unusual punishment?
In none of these cases is there any true "waiver," because a
waiver is a voluntary relinquishment of a known right. Instead
the Government is conditioning benefits on the recipient giving
up constitutional rights. The Court will not allow any such
forced relinquishment or surrender of constitutional rights, as
indicated in the leading case on this issue, South Dakota v.
Dole. 88 In that case Chief Justice Rehnquist, for the Court, upheld the power of Congress to withhold federal highway funds
from states that allowed the purchase of liquor by people under
21 years of age. The Court used a four-part test to determine if
conditions imposed are valid under the spending clause. First,
the spending power must be in pursuit of the general welfare;
second, Congress must speak "unambiguously" so that recipients of the funds exercise their choices knowingly; third, the
condition must not be unrelated to federal interest in the particular national program; and fourth, there must not be an
"independent constitutional bar" to the federal government's
conditional grant of funds. 89
Let us briefly focus on that fourth requirement, that there
be no "independent constitutional bar" to the federal government's conditional grant of funds. In Dole, the Court found that
the Twenty-first Amendment (dealing with state powers over
alcohol) was not an independent constitutional bar. But, the
Court said, Congress could not use its spending powersto induce the States to engage in activities that would themselves be unconstitutional. Thus, for example, a grant of federal funds conditioned on invidiously discriminatory state action or the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment would
be an illegitimate exercise of the Congress' broad spending
90
power.

Congress, in short, could no more use its spending power to require its contracting parties to waive their rights under the
Fourth Amendment than it could use its spending power to require its contracting parties to waive their rights under the
Eighth Amendment, forbidding cruel and unusual punishment.

88. 483 u.s. 203 (1987).
89. Id. at 209.
90. Id. at 210-11.
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c. "Pervasively Regulated" Industries
The last major argument is that Congress can dispense with
the Fourth Amendment protections such as the requirement of a
search warrant and probable cause, because the places to be
searched are already "pervasively regulated" so that the requirements of the Fourth Amendment are inapplicable.
First, many of the places to be searched are not
"pervasively regulated." My garage, for example is not pervasively regulated, but it is subject to be searched under the ewe.
The Clorox Corporation is not pervasively regulated, but chlorine can be used to make poison gas. A soap manufacturer is
not pervasively regulated, but the long arm of the ewe subjects
the soap manufacturer to extensive searches without a warrant.
Second, whatever the meaning of "pervasively regulated,"
the Supreme Court has told us that it does not include the Dow
Chemical Company.91 The Dow Chemical Company is an obvious target of the CWC-indeed, the United States has already
said that the entire "private chemical industry of the United
States is fully subject to the inspection provisions" of the ewC. 92
But the Supreme Court has made it quite clear that the Fourth
Amendment applies with full force to that company and others
like it.
The Court has explained that a "closely regulated industry"
is "the exception," not the rule. 93 What distinguishes closely
regulated enterprises from ordinary businesses "is a long tradition of close government supervision, of which any person who

91. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986). The Court (5 to 4)
upheld aerial observation, within navigable airspace, by the EPA of open areas, a 2000acre tract. The majority made it clear that Dow did not have a "subjective expectation
of being free from aerial surveillance since Dow had taken no precautions against such
observation, in contrast to its elaborate ground-level precautions." 476 U.S. at 230
(emphasis added). The majority, id. at 237, acknowledged Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S.
594 (1981 ), the case referring to "pervasively regulated businesses, and explicitly stated:
Dow plainly has a reasonable, legitimate, and objective expectation of privacy
"-:ithi.n the inte~ior ~!its covered buildings, and it is equally clear that expectation IS one soctety IS prepared to observe.
476 U.S. at 236 (emphasis added). The Court emphasized that the EPA engaged in only
aerial observation, did not use "highly sophisticated surveillance equipment," and effectuated its observations "without physical entry." Id. at 237-38 (footnote omitted)
(emphasis in original). Needless to say, the CWC contemplates physical entry of enclosed spaces, which would then be subject to extensive searches.
92. Statement of the U.S. Representative to the Conference on Disarmament:
Chemical Weapons Convention-Compliance, July 19, 1984, reprinted in Documents on
Disarmament 531, 534 (1984) (cited in note 32).
93. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1978).
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chooses to enter such a business must already be aware." 94 The
Supreme Court has warned us that "pervasively regulated business( es)"- that is, liquor, firearms, and mining- are "responses
to relatively unique circumstances. " 95 The "businessman in a
regulated industry in effect consents to the restrictions placed
upon him." 96 The ewe, in contrast, is not limited to pervasively
regulated industries. It is not even limited to commercial
buildings.
91
Donovan v. Dewey is the leading case presenting the
"pervasively regulated" rationale for removing the need for a
criminal search warrant. The case upheld warrantless inspections of underground and surface mines. The Court noted that
the "statute's inspection program, in terms of the certainty and
regularity of its application~rovides a constitutionally adequate
What commentators often miss
substitute for a warrant."
about this decision is why the Court dispensed with the normal
warrant requirement. The Donovan Court found it "difficult to
see what additional protections a warrant requirement would
provide" 99 because of three factors that the Court stressed.
None of these factors apply to the CWC's intrusive inspections.
First, "the Act requires inspection of all mines and specifically defines the frequency of inspection. " 100 The ewe will not
provide for regular inspection of all places that could produce or
store chemical weapons. Indeed, because the standard inspections (i.e., the inspections other than the challenge inspections)
are tied to the quantity of specific chemicals produced, the eligibility of some facilities may be episodic. Moreover, challenge
inspections may occur anywhere; they are not imposed solely at
facilities capable of producing dual-use chemicals.
Second, the Mine Act provided that a mine operator could
know the inspector's purpose and the limits of the inspection
because "the standards with which a mine operator is required
to comply are all specifically set forth in the Act or in Title 30 of
the Code of Federal Regulations." 101 Needless to say, the ewe
does not provide specificity regarding the limits of the inspec94. Id. at 313.
95. Id. (citation omitted).
96. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266,271 (1973).
97. 452 u.s. 594 (1981).
98. Id. at 603.
99. ld. at 605
100. Id. at 603-04 (emphasis in original).
101. Id. at 604.
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tion. On the contrary, it authorizes the inspector to look in
every nook, niche, and cranny.
Third- and this is the most important limitation- "the Act
provides a specific mechanism for accommodating any special
102
privacy concerns that a specific mine operator might have." If
the mine operator refused entry (which he or she could legally
do-unlike the regime of the CWC), the Secretary of Labor
could not search the premises; instead, he could only commence
a civil action to allow a search. This injunctive proceeding provided an adversary hearing in which a court could determine
whether the search should proceed and, if it should, under what
limits. 103
When the law enforcement official seeks a search warrant,
there is no adversary proceeding. The law enforcement official
presents his case, ex parte, before the magistrate. The Dewey
decision gave the mine operator more protection than she would
have received in the case of a regular search warrant.
Another way of examining this issue is to ask whether the
requirement of a warrant would benefit the mine operator more
than the statutory scheme. 104 The Dewey Court found that it
would be "difficult to see what additional protection a warrant
requirement would provide." 105 The warrant requirement (the
ex parte proceeding) offers less protection than the statute,
which provided an adversary hearing. 106 The Dewey Court gave
the mine inspector no right to bust in without a search warrant.
Instead, the inspector could only ask permission to inspect. If
the mine operator refused entry, the inspector had the burden of
going to court and seeking an injunction. The Dewey decisioneven in the case of "pervasively regulated" industries-does not
sanction the warrantless general search that the CWC contemplates.
There should be little doubt that the CWC has serious
problems under the Fourth Amendment after Marshall v. Bar107
low's Inc. In that case the Court considered a provision of the
102. Id. at 604.
103. Id. at 605. See generally Wayne R. LaFave, 4 Search and Seizure: A Treatise
on the Fourth Amendment§ 10.2(b) at 408-08 (West, 3d ed. 1996).
104. This analysis is developed more fully in LaFave, 4 Search and Seizure § 10.2(h)
at 455-56 (cited in note 103).
105. 452 U.S. at 605.
106. See LaFave, 4 Search and Seizure§ 10.2(h) at 455-56 (cited in note 103): ~A
warrant is clearly of no benefit" when a statute provides that there shall be an adversary
hearing "in lieu of the ex parte application."
107. 436 u.s. 307 (1978).
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Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) permitting inspectors-without any warrant-to:
enter without delay and at reasonable times any factory, plant,
establishment, construction site, or other area, workplace or
environment where work is performed by an employee of an
employer ... to inspect and investigate during regular working hours and at other reasonable times, and within reasonable
limits and in a reasonable manner, any such place of employment and all pertinent conditions, structures, machines, apparatus, devices, equipment, and materials therein, and to question privately any such employer, owner, operator, agent, or
108
employee.

The searches that OSHA authorized were-unlike ewe
searches-limited to business establishments. The statutory
searches that OSHA authorized were-unlike CWC searcheslimited in scope and (as the statute kept emphasizing)
"reasonable." Yet, the Supreme Court nevertheless held that
this OSHA provision violated the Fourth Amendment.
The OSHA searches were unconstitutional without a search
warrant, even though the Court admitted that OSHA regulates
"a myriad of safety details that may be amenable to speedy alteration or disguise. " 109 The searches of the ewe will be more
intrusive and more extensive than the searches discussed in the
Marshall case. If the OSHA searches were unconstitutional,
then a fortiori, the more extensive searches of the ewe must
also violate the Constitution.
3. The CWC and the Protections of American Constitutional
Law
The Fourth Amendment, unlike the just compensation
clause, is not cured by the mere payment of money. The exclusionary rule, monetary damages, and injunctions are three of the
remedies that the courts have created to protect the rights secured by the Fourth Amendment. The first two remedies do not
cure the violation-they merely seek to provide some sort of
remedy. An injunction, on the other hand, is an effective remedy that is designed to prevent the violation. That is why proponents of the ewe have urged Congress to take away from the

108. 29 U.S.C.A. § 657(a) (emphasis added).
109. 436 U.S. at 316.
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judiciary its power to issue inlunctions of unconstitutional
0
searches authorized by the ewe.'
If Congress seeks to limit the powers of courts to implement the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment, the courts will
most likely invalidate this restriction,'" and then hold that some
or all of the ewe is unconstitutional. Then the United States
will be in violation of international law. A treaty, as Chief Justice Marshall noted long ago, is a contract between two or more
nations. 112 If we breach this contract, we are violating international law, even though the breach is required by our domestic
law, that is, by our Constitution. In addition, if the United
States does not compl~ with all of the CWC terms, the ewe
provides for sanctions.' 3
We should not be dumbfounded if foreign adversaries (who
often do not respect our basic legal principles such as probable
cause, search warrants, intellectual property, and just compensation) castigate America's refusal to follow international law,
using these court challenges for political propaganda, claiming
that the judicial response of American courts demonstrates that
the United States does not really support the elimination of
chemical weapons. Moreover, other countries may use their
own constitutions to justify and excuse their refusal to comply
with the ewe.
The ewe gives only a very limited recognition to these
problems and does not provide for a constitutional defense
against an effort to impose sanctions, or a defense of a charge of
violating international law. Article VII recognizes that each
state's obligations to enact legislation must be "in accordance
with its constitutional processes.""4 However, this requirement,
read in context, only means that the United States must follow
its normal procedures to enact legislation (an affirmative vote of
both Houses of Congress plus the Presidential signature or an
override of a veto). Unfortunately, Article VII of the ewe
does not excuse the United States from enacting the necessary
legislation merely because the legislation would violate our own
Constitution.
110. Kellman and Tanzman, Implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention at 16
(cited in note 4).
111. For a complete discussion, see Rotunda and Nowak, I Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure§§ 2.10, 2.11 (cited in note 4).
112 Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829). See also Head Money
Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884).
113. CWC, Art. XII,, I. See also id. at n 2-4 (cited in note 6).
114. CWC, Art. VII,, 1 (cited in note 6).
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Part X of the Verification Annex includes an unusual paragraph. Part X deals with challenge inspections pursuant to Article IX and inspections of perimeters. Paragraph 41 provides
that the inspected State-in providing access to a perimeter area
specified in paragraph 38-must allow the inspectors "the greatest degree of access taking into account any constitutional obligations it may have with regard to proprietary rights or searches
and seizures." 115
This provision may have been drafted to give comfort, but
it is troubling. First, it only applies to searches under paragraph
38. The negative pregnant of this statement is that constitutional obligations do not apply in other circumstances.
Second, the last sentence of this paragraph 41 undercuts the
narrow protection afforded earlier when it states:
The provisions in this paragraph may not be invoked by the
inspected State Party to conceal evasion of its obligations not
116
to engage in activities prohibited under this Convention.

Only the United States, not a private individual, can invoke this
paragraph, because only the United States is the "inspected
State Party."
Moreover, although the United States can raise an objection to searches under paragraph 38, it is asked to promise solemnly that it will not raise any constitutional objections (the
"constitutional obligation," this paragraph provides, "may not
be invoked") for an improper purpose. But that restrictionwhich limits the right of the United States to follow its own Constitution-assumes the point in dispute; the inspectors cannot
determine if the United States is raising objections for an improper purpose unless the inspectors can inspect. The chilling
effect of this paragraph cabins the protections of the Fourth
Amendment, treats them as troublesome technicalities that private parties cannot raise at all, and requires the United States to
agree that it will not raise objections except in rare circumstances.
D. NORESERVATIONSALLOWED
In the past, it was quite common for the U.S. Senate to
avoid constitutional problems by ratifying a treaty subject to
various "reservations." The Senate, when ratifying the CWC,
115.
116.

ewe, Verification Annex, Part X, 'I 41 (cited in note 6).
ewe, Verification Annex, Part X, '141 (cited in note 6) (emphasis added).
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purported to enact various reservations. However, the CWC
precludes this alternative. It provides explicitly that "[t]he Arti117
cles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations."
Hence, no reservations are allowed by the ewe, even if the reservations are necessary in order to comply with our domestic
law, including U.S. Constitutional Law.
This provision is very significant and highly unusual. Because the United States has now ratified the CWC, if it enacts
legislation contrary to the ewe, it will be violating international
law. If the United States reserves this clause (makes a reservation to the no reservations clause) it will also be violating the
ewe, because the CWC plainly allows no reservations. Nonetheless, Congress must respect our Constitution and, at the very
minimum, should authorize no searches under the CWC unless
the inspectors first obtain a search warrant, from a neutral magistrate, upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
describing with particularity the places to be searched and the
things to be seized. Congress should also create a reasonable
procedure to provide just compensation if any intellectual property is improperly taken because of a ewe inspection.
CONCLUSION
We all wish that poison gas and other chemical weapons
had never been invented, but that genie is out of the bottle. The
Chemical Weapons Convention, unfortunately, will not fulfill its
promise of wiping these weapons from the face of the earth, but
it may give us a false sense of security and lull us into thinking
that a serious problem has found a solution. Equally unfortunate is the fact that the ewe will authorize intrusive inspections
of thousands of private facilities, businesses and homes, resulting in the violation of the Fourth Amendment and the taking of
intellectual property (for which this country must provide just
compensation).

117. CWC, Art. XXII, at 45 (cited in note 6). To leave no room for any doubt, this
clause goes on to say, "The Annexes of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations incompatible with its object and purpose." Id. Hence, there can be no material
reservation to any of the Annexes to the CWC.

